Powerlessness and Social Interpretation by Fricker, Miranda

96 E P I S T E M E  2 0 0 6
M i r a n d a  F r i c k e r
Powerlessness and Social Interpretation
abstract
Our understanding of social experiences is central to our social understanding more 
generally. But this sphere of epistemic practice can be structurally prejudiced by 
unequal relations of power, so that some groups suff er a distinctive kind of epistemic 
injustice—hermeneutical injustice. I aim to achieve a clear conception of this epistemic-
ethical phenomenon, so that we have a workable defi nition and a proper understanding 
of the wrong that it infl icts.
I want to explore the idea that social understanding—in particular our understanding 
of our own social experiences—is a sphere of epistemic activity in which relations of 
identity and power can create a particular kind of epistemic injustice, with the upshot 
that some social groups are unable to dissent from distorted understandings of their 
social experiences. To see better what the contours of such an injustice might be, let us 
begin with a historical example drawn from Susan Brownmiller’s memoir of the U.S. 
Women’s Liberation Movement, which concerns the experience of what we are these 
days in a position to name sexual harassment:
Carmita Wood, age forty-four, born and raised in the apple orchard region of Lake Cayuga, 
and the sole support of two of her children, had worked for eight years in Cornell’s department 
of nuclear physics, advancing from lab assistant to a desk job handling administrative chores. 
Wood did not know why she had been singled out, or indeed if she had been singled out, but 
a distinguished professor seemed unable to keep his hands off  her.
 As Wood told the story, the eminent man would jiggle his crotch when he stood near her desk 
and looked at his mail, or he’d deliberately brush against her breasts while reaching for some 
papers. One night as the lab workers were leaving their annual Christmas party, he cornered 
her in the elevator and planted some unwanted kisses on her mouth. Aft er the Christmas 
party incident, Carmita Wood went out of her way to use the stairs in the lab building in 
order to avoid a repeat encounter, but the stress of the furtive molestations and her eff orts to 
keep the scientist at a distance while maintaining cordial relations with his wife, whom she 
liked, brought on a host of physical symptoms. Wood developed chronic back and neck pains. 
Her right thumb tingled and grew numb. She requested a transfer to another department, 
and when it didn’t come through, she quit. She walked out the door and went to Florida for 
some rest and recuperation. Upon her return she applied for unemployment insurance. When 
the claims investigator asked why she had left  her job aft er eight years, Wood was at a loss to 
describe the hateful episodes. She was ashamed and embarrassed. Under prodding—the blank 
on the form needed to be fi lled in—she answered that her reasons had been personal. Her 
claim for unemployment benefi ts was denied.
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‘Lin’s students had been talking in her seminar about the unwanted sexual advances they’d 
encountered on their summer jobs,’ Sauvigne relates. ‘And then Carmita Wood comes in and 
tells Lin her story. We realized that to a person, every one of us—the women on staff , Carmita, 
the students—had had an experience like this at some point, you know? And none of us had 
ever told anyone before. It was one of those click, aha! moments, a profound revelation.’
 … Meyer located two feminist lawyers in Syracuse, Susan Horn and Maurie Heins, to take 
on Carmita Wood’s unemployment insurance appeal. ‘And then …’ Sauvigne reports ‘we 
 decided that we also had to hold a speak-out in order to break the silence about this.’
 Th e ‘this’ they were going to break the silence about had no name. ‘Eight of us were sitting 
in an offi  ce of Human Aff airs,’ Sauvigne remembers, ‘brainstorming about what we were 
 going to write on the posters for our speak-out. We were referring to it as ‘sexual intimidation,’ 
‘sexual coercion,’ ‘sexual exploitation on the job.’ None of those names seemed quite right. We 
wanted something that embraced a whole range of subtle and unsubtle persistent behaviors. 
Somebody came up with ‘harassment.’ Sexual harassment! Instantly we agreed. Th at’s what it 
was’ (Brownmiller 1990, 280-1).
Here is a story about how extant collective hermeneutical resources can have a lacuna 
where the name of a distinctive social experience should be. So described, we can see 
that women such as Carmita Wood suff ered (among other things) an acute cognitive 
disadvantage from a gap in the collective hermeneutical resource. But this description 
does not quite capture it, for if the epistemic wrong done to Carmita Wood were 
construed simply as a matter of plain cognitive disadvantage, then it is unclear why 
the epistemic wrong is suff ered only by her and not also by her harasser. For the lack 
of proper understanding of women’s experience of sexual harassment was a collective 
disadvantage more or less shared by all. Prior to the collective appreciation of sexual 
harassment as such, the absence of a proper understanding of what men were doing 
to women when they treated them like that was ex hypothesi quite general. Diff erent 
groups can be hermeneutically disadvantaged for all sorts of reasons, as the changing 
social world frequently generates new sorts of experience of which our understanding 
may dawn only gradually, but only some of these cognitive disadvantages will strike 
one as unjust. For something to be an injustice it must be harmful but also wrongful, 
whether because discriminatory or otherwise unfair. In the present example, harasser and 
harassee alike are cognitively handicapped by the hermeneutical lacuna—neither has a 
proper understanding of how he is treating her—but the harasser’s cognitive disablement 
is not a signifi cant disadvantage to him. Indeed there is an obvious sense in which it 
suits his purpose. (Or at least it suits his immediate purpose in that it leaves his conduct 
unchallenged. Th is is not to deny that if he is a decent person underneath, so that a better 
understanding of the seriousness of his bad behaviour would have led him to refrain, 
then the hermeneutical lacuna is for him a source of epistemic and moral bad luck.) By 
contrast, the harassee’s cognitive disablement is seriously disadvantageous to her. Th e 
cognitive disablement prevents her from understanding an important patch of her own 
experience; that is, a patch of experience which it is strongly in her interests to understand, 
for without that understanding she is left  deeply troubled, confused, and isolated, not to 
mention vulnerable to continued harassment. Her hermeneutical disadvantage renders 
her unable to make sense of her ongoing mistreatment, and this in turn prevents her from 
protesting it, let alone securing eff ective measures to stop it.
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Th e fact that the hermeneutical lacuna creates such an asymmetrical disadvantage for 
the harassee already fuels the idea that there is something wrongful about her cognitive 
disadvantage in particular. We would not describe her as suff ering an injustice if it were 
not signifi cantly disadvantageous for her in particular. But there is more than this to 
be said about the wrong that she sustains. We need to fi nd the deeper source of the 
intuition that she incurs an injustice. We can easily imagine, aft er all, similarly serious 
hermeneutical disadvantages that do not infl ict any epistemic injustice. If, for instance, 
someone has a certain medical condition aff ecting their behaviour at a historical moment 
at which that condition is still misunderstood and largely undiagnosed, then they may 
suff er a hermeneutical disadvantage that is, while collective, especially damaging to them 
in particular. Th ey are unable to render their experiences intelligible by reference to the 
idea that they have a disorder, and so they are personally in the dark, and may also suff er 
seriously negative consequences from others’ non-comprehension of their condition. 
But they are not subject to hermeneutical injustice; rather, theirs is a poignant case of 
circumstantial epistemic bad luck. In order to fi nd the deeper source of the intuition that 
there is an epistemic injustice at stake in our example from Brownmiller we should focus 
on the background social conditions that were conducive to the relevant hermeneutical 
lacuna. Women’s position at the time of second wave feminism was still one of marked 
social powerlessness in relation to men; and, specifi cally, the unequal relations of power 
prevented women from participating on equal terms with men in those practices by 
which collective social meanings are generated. Most obvious among such practices are 
those sustained by professions such as journalism, politics, academia, and law—it is no 
accident that Brownmiller’s memoir recounts so much pioneering feminist activity in 
and around these professional spheres and their institutions. Women’s powerlessness 
meant that their social position was one of unequal hermeneutical participation, and 
something like this sort of inequality provides the crucial background condition for the 
epistemic injustice aff ecting Carmita Wood.
hermeneutical marginalization and hermeneutical injustice
Hermeneutical inequality is an epistemic inequality that arises from social inequality, and 
it is inevitably hard to detect. Our interpretive eff orts are naturally geared to interests, 
as we try hardest to understand those things it serves us to understand. Consequently, a 
group’s unequal hermeneutical participation will tend to show up in a localised manner 
in hermeneutical hotspots—locations in social life where the powerful have no interest 
in achieving a proper interpretation, perhaps indeed where they have a positive interest 
in sustaining the extant misinterpretation (such as that repeated sexual propositions in 
the workplace are necessarily just a way of ‘fl irting’, and their uneasy rejection by the 
recipient a matter of her ‘lacking a sense of humour’). But then in such a hotspot as 
this, the unequal hermeneutical participation remains positively disguised by the existing 
meaning attributed to the behaviour (‘fl irting’…), and so it is all the more diffi  cult to 
detect. No wonder that moments of its revelation can come as a life-changing fl ash of 
enlightenment. Unlike our example of a person with a condition for which medical 
science does not yet have the proper diagnosis, what women like Carmita Wood had to 
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contend with at work was no plain epistemic bad luck, for it was no accident that their 
experience had been falling down the hermeneutical cracks. As they struggled in isolation 
to make proper sense of their various experiences of harassment, the whole engine of 
collective social meaning was eff ectively geared to keeping these obscured experiences 
out of sight. Her unequal hermeneutical participation is the deeper reason why Carmita 
Wood’s cognitive disablement constitutes an injustice.
Let us say that when there is unequal hermeneutical participation with respect to 
some signifi cant area(s) of social experience, members of the disadvantaged group are 
hermeneutically marginalized. Th e notion of marginalization is a moral-political one 
indicating subordination and exclusion from some practice that would have value for 
the participant. Obviously there can be more and less persistent and/or wide-ranging 
cases of hermeneutical marginalization. Although the term will be most at home in cases 
where the subject is persistently denied full hermeneutical participation in respect of a 
wide range of social experiences, nonetheless we can apply the term in slighter cases. Th us 
someone might be hermeneutically marginalized only fl eetingly, and/or only in respect 
of a highly localized patch of their social experience. But hermeneutical marginalization 
is always socially coerced. If you simply opt out of full participation in hermeneutical 
practices as a matter of choice (perhaps, fed up with it all, you become a modern hermit) 
then you do not count as hermeneutically marginalized—you’ve opted out but you could 
have opted in. Hermeneutical marginalization is always a form of powerlessness, whether 
structural or one-off .
Social subjects of course have more or less complex social identities, and so one might 
be marginalized in a context where one aspect of one’s identity is to the fore (‘woman’) 
but not in other contexts where other aspects of one’s identity are determining one’s 
level of participation (‘middle-class’). Th e net result is that while a hermeneutically 
marginalized subject is prevented from generating meanings pertaining to some areas 
of the social world, she might well maintain a fuller participation as regards others. 
If she has a well-paid job in a large corporation with a macho work ethic she may be 
entirely unable to frame meanings, even to herself, relating to the need for family-friendly 
working conditions (such sentiments can only signal a lack of professionalism, a failure of 
ambition, a half-hearted commitment to the job), and yet she may be in a hermeneutically 
luxurious position as regards her ability to make sense of other, less gendered, areas of 
her work experience. Th us the complexity of social identity means that hermeneutical 
marginalization affl  icts individuals in a diff erentiated manner; that is, it may affl  ict them 
qua one social type, but not another.
We can now defi ne hermeneutical injustice of the sort suff ered by women like 
Carmita Wood. It is: the injustice of having some signifi cant area of one’s social experience 
obscured fr om collective understanding owing to persistent and wide-ranging hermeneutical 
marginalization. But the latter notion is cumbersome, and we would do well to make 
our defi nition slightly more explicit in terms of what is bad about hermeneutical 
marginalization of the persistent and wide-ranging sort. From the epistemic point of 
view, what is bad about this sort of hermeneutical marginalization is that it renders 
the collective hermeneutical resource structurally prejudiced, for it will tend to issue 
interpretations of that group’s social experiences that are biased because insuffi  ciently 
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infl uenced by the subject group and therefore unduly infl uenced by more hermeneutically 
powerful groups (thus, for instance, sexual harassment as fl irting, rape in marriage as 
non-rape, post-natal depression as hysteria, reluctance to work family-unfriendly hours 
as unprofessionalism, and so on). We can now colour our defi nition slightly diff erently, 
without altering its substance, so that it better conveys the discriminatory nature of 
hermeneutical injustice. Hermeneutical injustice is: the injustice of having some signifi cant 
area of one’s social experience obscured fr om collective understanding owing to a structural 
prejudice in the collective hermeneutical resource.
Our defi nition has grown out of the eff ort to identify the sort of hermeneutical 
injustice suff ered by Carmita Wood, and as a result the defi nition is not generic. Rather 
it specifi cally captures what we might call the systematic case of hermeneutical injustice. 
Now what exactly does ‘systematic’ mean here? Th e thought is that some groups may 
suff er marginalization in respect of only one localized area of their social life, whereas 
others—those perhaps like Carmita Wood—are also marginalized economically, and/
or politically, educationally, professionally, and so on. (Indeed, in cases of systematic 
hermeneutical injustice, the hermeneutical marginalization entails marginalization of at 
least a socio-economic sort, since it entails non-participation in professions that make 
for signifi cant hermeneutical participation such as journalism, politics, law, and so on.) 
Let us say, then, that if marginalization pursues the subject through a range of diff erent 
dimensions of social activity besides the hermeneutical, then any hermeneutical injustices 
to which it gives rise are systematic. Systematic hermeneutical injustices are part of the 
broad pattern of a social group’s general susceptibility to diff erent sorts of injustice. We 
should think of systematic hermeneutical injustice as the central case—it is central from 
the point of view of an interest in how epistemic injustice is woven into the fabric of 
social injustice more generally.
By contrast, there can be cases of hermeneutical injustice that are not part of the general 
pattern of social power, and are more of a one-off . Th ey are not systematic but incidental. 
Whereas systematic cases will tend to involve persistent and wide-ranging hermeneutical 
marginalization, incidental cases will tend to involve hermeneutical marginalization 
only fl eetingly and/or in respect of a highly localized patch of the subject’s experience. 
Incidental hermeneutical injustices, then, stem not from any structural inequality 
of power but rather from a more one-off  moment of powerlessness. What might an 
incidental case of hermeneutical injustice look like? In Ian McEwan’s novel Enduring 
Love the main protagonist, Joe, is stalked by a young man called Jed Parry, a religious 
fanatic with delusions of love between him and Joe. When Joe tells his partner, Clarissa, 
about it he meets fi rst aff ectionate derision and then, later—although she accepts the 
basics of what he is telling her—her reaction is more one of concerned reserve about his 
state of mind. When, subsequently, he calls the police, Joe fi nds that the form of stalking 
he is enduring does not make the legal grade and is represented as trivial:
 ‘Are you the person being harassed?’
 ‘Yes. I’ve been…’
 And is the person causing the nuisance with you now?’
 ‘He’s standing outside my place this very minute.’
 ‘Has he infl icted any physical harm on you?’
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 ‘No, but he…’
 ‘Has he threatened you with harm?’
 ‘No.’ I understood that my grievance would have to be poured into the available bureau cratic 
mould. Th ere was no facility refi ned enough to process every private narrative. Denied the 
release of complaint, I tried to take comfort in having my story assimilated into a recognisable 
public form. Parry’s behaviour had to be generalised into a crime.
 ‘Has he made threats against your property?’
 ‘No.’
 ‘Or against third parties?’
 ‘No.’
 ‘Is he trying to blackmail you?’
 ‘No.’
 ‘Do you think you could prove that he intends to cause you distress?’
 ‘Er, no.’
 … ‘Can you tell me what he’s doing then?’
 ‘He phones me at all hours. He talks to me in the …’
 Th e voice was quick to move back to his default position, the interrogative fl ow chart. ‘Is he 
using obscene or insulting behaviour?’
 ‘No. Look, offi  cer. Why don’t you let me explain. He’s a crank. He won’t let me alone.’
 ‘Are you aware of what he actually wants?’ …
 ‘He wants to save me.’
 ‘Save you?’
 ‘You know, convert me. He’s obsessed. He simply won’t leave me alone.’
 Th e voice cut in, impatience taking hold at last. ‘I’m sorry caller. Th is is not a police matter. 
Unless he harms you, or your property, or threatens the same he’s committing no off ence. 
Trying to convert you is not against the law.’ Th en he terminated our emergency conversation 
with his own little stricture. ‘We do have religious freedom in this country.’ (McEwan 1998, 
73-74)
Joe’s own understanding of his experience of being stalked is only slightly hindered 
by the lack of hermeneutical reciprocation by partner and police, but still a collective 
hermeneutical lacuna is preventing him from rendering his experience communicatively 
intelligible. It is very much in his interests to share his experience with certain others 
from the off ; but he cannot, for the true nature of his experience of being stalked by 
Jed Parry is obscured by two misfi t interpretations that trivialize it in diff erent ways. 
According to one he seems to be failing to see the funny side and becoming worryingly 
obsessed; according to another he is exaggerating the level of threat and even cramping 
someone else’s religious freedom into the bargain. But if the obscurity of Joe’s experience 
constitutes a kind of hermeneutical injustice, this has nothing to do with any general 
social powerlessness or any general subordination as a generator of social meaning, for 
his social identity is that of the proverbial white, educated, straight man. Still he is none 
the less up against a one-off  moment of hermeneutical marginalization. Th e competing 
and trivializing interpretations coming from Clarissa and the police respectively mean 
that Joe’s hermeneutical participation is hindered in respect of a signifi cant, if highly 
localized, patch of his social experience, and for this reason his case qualifi es as a 
hermeneutical injustice. Th e injustice does not stem from any structural prejudice in 
hermeneutical resources—on the contrary, he suff ers the injustice not because of but 
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rather in spite of the hermeneutical ease he normally enjoys, indeed in spite of his general 
position of social power. Clearly Joe’s hermeneutical injustice is not a systematic case; it 
is incidental.
Awareness of such cases motivates a more generic defi nition of hermeneutical injustice 
than those so far given, which were designed to capture what we can now more clearly 
see to be the distinctively systematic case. Th e generic defi nition now called for captures 
hermeneutical injustice per se as: the injustice of having some signifi cant area of one’s social 
experience obscured fr om collective understanding owing to hermeneutical marginalization. 
Th is defi nition simply omits what is special to the systematic case, namely that the 
hermeneutical marginalization is ‘persistent and wide-ranging’, or, equivalently, that 
there is a ‘structural prejudice in the collective hermeneutical resource’. Th is generic 
defi nition, then, covers both the systematic case and the incidental case. As ever, the 
systematic case is central from our point of view. Th e non-centrality of incidental cases 
does not entail ethical triviality. Indeed it is life-shattering for Joe that his experience is 
not better understood from the start, since this allows Jed Parry’s stalking to escalate to 
ultimately mortally threatening levels, and it contributes too to the eventual collapse of 
his long relationship with Clarissa. Incidental hermeneutical injustices can be every bit 
as harmful as systematic ones.
We have encountered, then, two sorts of hermeneutical injustice: systematic 
and incidental. If someone is disadvantaged, as for instance Joe is, from having their 
experience left  obscure owing to a lacuna in the collective hermeneutical resource, then 
that is broadly suffi  cient for a claim of incidental hermeneutical injustice, even though 
the hermeneutical marginalization is localized and one-off . By contrast, if someone is 
disadvantaged, as for instance Carmita Wood is, by having their experience left  obscure 
owing to a lacuna in the collective hermeneutical resource, where the lacuna is caused and 
maintained by a wide-ranging and persistent hermeneutical marginalization, then the 
hermeneutical injustice is systematic. For in such cases the hermeneutical marginalization 
is part of a more general susceptibility to diff erent forms of social marginalization, so that 
any given hermeneutical injustice incurred is likewise part of a more general susceptibility 
to diff erent kinds of injustice. Whether the injustice is of the systematic or the incidental 
kind, it involves no perpetrator, no culprit. Hermeneutical injustice is a structural notion, 
for it is a form of inequality—it is an epistemic inequality. Th e background condition for 
hermeneutical injustice is the subject’s hermeneutical marginalization. And the actual 
moment of hermeneutical injustice comes when the background condition expresses 
itself in a more or less doomed attempt on the part of the subject to render an experience 
intelligible, either to herself or to an interlocutor. Th e hermeneutical inequality that 
exists, dormant, in a situation of hermeneutical marginalization erupts in injustice only 
when some actual attempt at intelligibility is handicapped by it.
Now that we have a clear idea of what defi nes hermeneutical injustice, in its systematic 
and incidental forms, let us try to probe the nature of the wrong it does to the subject 
whose interpretive eff orts at social understanding are hampered by it.
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the wrong of hermeneutical injustice
I have talked in terms of hermeneutical injustice involving an asymmetrical cognitive 
disadvantage. Th e general point here is that collective hermeneutical impoverishment 
impacts on members of diff erent groups in diff erent ways. It did not harm the interests 
of Carmita Wood’s harasser that he (as the example goes) did not have a proper grasp 
of the nature of his treatment of her; but it harmed Carmita Wood a great deal that she 
could not make adequate sense of it to herself, let alone to others. Th e asymmetry arises 
from the concrete social and practical context in which the collective hermeneutical 
impoverishment impinges. It is only when the collective impoverishment is concretely 
situated in specifi c social situations that it comes to be especially and unjustly 
disadvantageous to some groups and not others. Hermeneutical lacunas are like holes in 
the ozone—it’s the people who live under them that get burned. Fundamentally, then, 
hermeneutical injustice is a kind of structural discrimination. Compare a society that has 
a welfare state providing free healthcare at the point of delivery, but where there is a gap 
in state provision: no free dental care. Formally speaking, there is nothing intrinsically 
unjust about there being a general lack of free dental care, for it is the same for everyone—
there is, so to speak, a collective lacuna in the welfare system. Th ere is a formal equality, 
then; but as soon as one looks to how this formal equality plays out in practice in the 
lived social world, a situated inequality quickly reveals itself: people who cannot aff ord 
private dental care suff er from the lack of general provision, and people who can do not. 
In such cases of formal equality but lived inequality, the injustice is a matter of some 
group(s) being asymmetrically disadvantaged by a blanket collective lack, and so it is, I 
suggest, in the case of hermeneutical injustice. A hermeneutical injustice is done when a 
collective hermeneutical gap impinges so as to signifi cantly disadvantage some group(s) 
and not others, so that the way the collective impoverishment plays out in practice is 
eff ectively discriminatory. Let us say, then, that the primary harm of hermeneutical 
injustice consists in a situated hermeneutical inequality: the concrete situation is such that 
the subject is rendered unable to make communicatively intelligible something which it 
is particularly in his or her interests to be able to render intelligible.
Such is the primary harm. But there are also secondary harms, caused by the primary 
one, that may be usefully distinguished. Th e primary harm of situated hermeneutical 
inequality must, by defi nition, issue in further practical harms—those harms which 
render the collective hermeneutical impoverishment asymmetrically disadvantageous 
to the wronged party. To illustrate, let us simply remind ourselves of Carmita Wood’s 
story. Th e primary epistemic harm done to her was that a patch of her social experience 
which it was very much in her interests to understand was not collectively understood 
and so remained barely intelligible even to her. From the story we can see that among 
the secondary harms caused by this were that she developed physical symptoms of stress, 
could not apply successfully for a transfer owing to the fact that she had no nameable 
reason to cite, and eventually simply had to quit her job. Further, when she came to apply 
for unemployment benefi ts, the lack of a name for the cause of all this again guaranteed 
that she lost out—she was refused the benefi ts. A little imagination allows one to see 
how far-reaching the ramifi cations of such a case of hermeneutical injustice could be. 
Episteme3_1_08_Fricker.indd   103 29/11/06   11:15:57
104 E P I S T E M E  2 0 0 6
Miranda Fricker
If Carmita Wood, and other women like her, had never gone to consciousness-raising, 
the experience of sexual harassment would have remained under wraps for much longer 
and would have done more to ruin the professional advancement, the personal self-
confi dence and, most relevantly here, the general epistemic confi dence of women than 
it was in fact allowed to do, thanks to second wave feminism. When you fi nd yourself in 
a situation where you seem to be the only one to feel the dissonance between received 
understanding and your own intimated sense of a given experience it tends to knock 
your faith in your own ability to make sense of the world, or at least the relevant region 
of the world. We can see, then, that not only does hermeneutical injustice have knock-
on practical disadvantages for the subject, it also has epistemic disadvantages associated 
with it.
Th e sorts of epistemic disadvantages at stake stem most basically from the subject’s 
loss of epistemic confi dence. Many conceptions of knowledge implicitly or explicitly cast 
some sort of epistemic confi dence as a condition of knowledge, whether it comes in as 
part of the belief condition, or as part of a justifi cation condition. If we are to name 
one seminal epistemological view in this connection, then it must surely be Descartes’s 
idea that a state of absolute confi dence in one’s belief—a state of certainty—is requisite 
for knowledge, for the some such internalist assumption has made itself felt in so many 
conceptions of knowledge subsequently. Th e signifi cance for the present discussion 
is that, on any confi dence-including conception of knowledge, the implications for 
someone whose epistemic performance is aff ected by hermeneutical injustice are grim: 
not only is he repeatedly subject to the primary harm, but where this causes him to lose 
confi dence in his beliefs and/or his justifi cation for them, he literally loses knowledge. 
Perhaps some piece of knowledge he possesses is washed away in a one-off  wave of under-
confi dence. Or perhaps he suff ers a prolonged erosion of epistemic confi dence so that 
he is ongoingly disadvantaged, repeatedly failing to gain items of knowledge he would 
otherwise have been able to gain.
A less direct way in which someone’s general loss of epistemic confi dence might result 
in an ongoing failure to gain knowledge is by preventing him from developing certain 
intellectual virtues. Most notably, for instance, loss of epistemic confi dence is likely to 
inhibit the development of intellectual courage, the virtue of not backing down in one’s 
convictions too quickly in response to challenge. Th is is an important feature of epistemic 
function. James Montmarquet categorizes the epistemic virtues into those of ‘impartiality’, 
‘intellectual sobriety’, and ‘intellectual courage’, where this last category includes ‘most 
prominently the willingness to conceive and examine alternatives to popularly held 
beliefs, perseverance in the face of opposition from others (until one is convinced one is 
mistaken), and the determination required to see such a project through to completion’ 
(Montmarquet 1993, 23). Th ese diff erent virtues relating to intellectual courage require 
epistemic confi dence and are obviously susceptible to erosion by hermeneutical injustice. 
So if a history of such injustices gnaws away at a person’s intellectual confi dence, or never 
lets it develop in the fi rst place, this damages his epistemic function quite generally. Th e 
under-confi dent subject will tend to back down too soon in the face of challenge, or 
even at the very prospect of it, and this tendency may well deprive him of knowledge he 
would otherwise have gained. In such a case there will be a series of specifi c deprivations 
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of knowledge—beliefs or hypotheses that are given up too quickly—where some of 
these epistemic deprivations may constitute signifi cant losses. More generally, and quite 
apart from the obvious fact that feelings of under-confi dence are generally unpleasant in 
themselves, there is also an epistemic loss to the subject in terms of his intellectual character. 
Th e value of an intellectual virtue is not reducible to the value of those particular items 
of knowledge it might bring, but derives also from its place in the harmony of a person’s 
intellectual character taken as a whole. Whatever the consequences may or may not be 
for the subject in terms of knowledge loss, an enduring loss of intellectual confi dence 
entails a certain regrettable malformation of epistemic character.
unjust social constructions
With the primary and secondary aspects of the wrong of hermeneutical injustice set 
out, perhaps we can now dig a little deeper into the nature of the primary aspect—the 
situated hermeneutical inequality—to see whether it might sometimes aff ect not only 
one’s understanding of one’s experiences but one’s very social identity. Can hermeneutical 
injustice impact on the very development of self ? Consider a new example. In Edmund 
White’s autobiographical novel, A Boy’s Own Story, which tells the story of his growing 
up in nineteen-fi ft ies America, we are presented with many diff erent ways in which the 
hermeneutical resources of the day burden his sexual experience with layers of falsifying 
meaning. As he grows up he has to contend with various powerful bogeymen constructions 
of what it is to be a Homosexual. None of them fi ts, but these collective understandings 
are so powerful, and the personal experiential promise of an alternative understanding 
so lonely and inarticulate, that they have some signifi cant power to construct not only 
the subject’s experience (his desire becomes shameful and so on) but also his very social 
being. Not without a fi ght, for sure, and this autobiographical story presents us above all 
with a young person who wrestles these bullying would-be selves with courage and wit, 
now giving in to their bid to claim his identity, now resisting. Th is is explicit in a passage 
that recounts a visit to a psychoanalyst, Dr O’Reilly. Here we see how one version of 
the unnatural homosexual—as a vampire-like version of a man—leads our adolescent 
subject to fear the name, and to experience his own nascent identity as a homosexual as 
a terrifying prospect, something to be pre-empted at all costs and, in so far as it already 
exists, disguised:
Just as years before, when I was seven, I had presented myself to a minister and had sought for 
his understanding, in the same way now I was turning to a psychoanalyst for help. I wanted 
to overcome this thing I was becoming and was in danger soon of being, the homosexual, 
as though that designation were the mold in which the water was freezing, the fi rst crystals 
already forming a fragile membrane. Th e confusion and fear and pain that beset me … had 
translated me into a code no one could read, I least of all, a code perhaps designed to defeat 
even the best cryptographer. …
 I see now that what I wanted was to be loved by men and to love them back but not to 
be a homosexual. For I was possessed with a yearning for the company of men, for their 
look, touch and smell, and nothing transfi xed me more than the sight of a man shaving and 
dressing, sumptuous rites. It was men, not women, who struck me as foreign and desirable and 
I disguised myself as a child or a man or whatever was necessary in order to enter their hushed, 
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hieratic company, my disguise so perfect I never stopped to question my identity. Nor did I 
want to study the face beneath my mask, lest it turn out to have the pursed lips, dead pallor 
and shaped eyebrows by which one can always recognize the Homosexual. What I required 
was a sleight of hand, an alibi or a convincing act of bad faith to persuade myself I was not that 
vampire (White 1983, 169-70).
At some level his personal sexual experience was of a simple love of men, and yet 
this aspect of his experience being inarticulable, the only psychological rebellion he 
could hope to pull off  against what this meant about his identity was denial. Denial 
is the fi rst stage of the double-think (the sleight of hand, the act of bad faith) that is 
required in order to rebel against internalized yet falsifying hermeneutical constructions 
of one’s social identity. For authoritative social constructions can eff ect a constitutive 
construction of one’s identity, so that one comes to count socially as a vampire-like 
creature, even while it remains the case that one is not. Constitutive construction falls 
short of causal construction, for while the former is a matter of what one counts as socially, 
the latter is a matter of actually coming to be what one is constructed as being. White’s 
autobiographical story gives us no particular evidence to think of him as subject to causal 
construction, though it is entirely plausible that being constitutively constructed as an 
unnatural vampire-like creature with shameful desires might encourage one to live out 
a familiar motif of inverted rebellion by behaving more and more like such a creature in 
defi ant embrace of one’s sins. One may be able to pull this off  ironically, but then again 
one may not. In any case, it is enough to notice that so much of what the younger narrator 
is grappling with as he grows up and his social identity congeals around him can be 
thought of as authoritative—collectively endorsed meanings attaching to homosexuality 
that have the power not just to haunt him with bogeyman would-be selves but actually 
to constitute his social being. His sometimes playful resistance to these constructions of 
his identity is, as regards his social being, a matter of life and death.
To the extent that resistance is possible, part of what makes it possible is historical 
contingency. Our narrator had history on his side in as much as the sixties were on the 
horizon when all sorts of sexual liberations were to be articulated, indeed demanded. 
But something else that allows for resistance is that other aspects of one’s identity (being 
educated and middle-class, perhaps) might equip one with resources for rebellion, as will 
certain personal characteristics (our narrator was surely fi ercely intelligent, psychologically 
tough, and socially resourceful). Authoritative constructions in the shared hermeneutical 
resource, then, impinge on us collectively but not uniformly, and the non-uniformity 
of their hold over us can create a sense of dissonance between an experience and the 
various constructions that are ganging up to overpower its proper nascent meaning. 
As individuals, some authoritative voices have special power over us while others, for 
whatever reason, do not. Our narrator, for instance, is wholly untroubled by negative 
Christian constructions of homosexuality, for he simply does not believe in the ropes and 
pulleys of heaven above and eternal damnation below, and his plain anti-authoritarian 
impulse renders him gloriously immune to whatever remaining visceral hold religious 
censure might have had over him. When he spends Th anksgiving with the Scotts—the 
housemaster Latin teacher and his wife, both fervent Christians ambitious to convert 
him (and equally ambitious to seduce him, their fear of being bourgeois outstripping 
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their fear of being sinners)—they introduce him to Father Burke, ‘their “confessor” and 
spiritual guardian’ (White 1983, 199):
‘Well, yes,’ I said, ‘I am seeing a psychiatrist because I have confl icts over certain homosexual 
tendencies I’m feeling.’
 At these words Father Burke’s face lurched up out of his hands. Not the nervous little 
confession he had expected. He recovered his poise and decided to laugh boisterously, the 
laugh of Catholic centuries. ‘Confl icts?’ he whooped, in tears of laughter by now. Th en, sobering 
for a second, the priest added in a low, casual voice, ‘But you see, my son, homosexuality isn’t 
just a confl ict that needs to be resolved’—his voice picked up these words as though they were 
nasty bits of refuse—‘homosexuality is also a sin.’
 I think he had no notion how little an eff ect the word sin had on me. He might just as well 
have said, ‘Homosexuality is bad juju’ (White 1983, 204).
By contrast, however, this immunity to the idea of sin is no enduring defence, for it 
takes almost nothing from the priest—only his identity as a priest, or perhaps simply as 
a straight male confessor—to conjure up a conspiracy of truly mortifying stereotypes. 
Th e passage continues:
‘But I feel very drawn to other men,’ I said. Although something defi ant in me forced these 
words out, I felt myself becoming a freak the moment I spoke. My hair went bleach-blond, my 
wrist went limp, my rep tie became a lace jabot: I was the simpering queen at the grand piano 
playing concert versions of last year’s pop tunes for his mother and her bridge club. Th ere 
was no way to defend what I was. All I could fi ght for was my right to choose my exile, my 
destruction (204).
A person’s bold sense of dissonance, then, is a fragile thing, for a construction that one 
is able simply to fi nd absurd may swift ly be followed by one that holds sway over one’s 
psyche. But at least a sense of dissonance is possible. What makes it possible is that if 
one fi nds one or more of the common constructions of one’s sexuality as shameful to be 
manifestly false, even ridiculous, then this raises the question whether other discourses in 
league with it are suspect too. Finding something potentially authoritative to be absurd 
gives one critical courage; one hermeneutical rebellion inspires another. Th e sense of 
dissonance, then, is the starting point for both the critical thinking and the moral-
intellectual courage that rebellion requires. Th at, I take it, is part of the mechanism of 
consciousness raising. Put a number of people together who have felt a certain dissonance 
about an area of social experience, and factor in that each of them will have a diff erent 
profi le of immunity and susceptibility to diff erent authoritative discourses, and it is 
not surprising that the sense of dissonance can fi nd strength in numbers and become 
critically emboldened.
Th e primary harm of hermeneutical injustice, then, is to be understood not only in 
terms of the subject’s being unfairly disadvantaged by some collective hermeneutical 
lacuna, but also in terms of the very construction (constitutive and/or causal) of social 
identity. In certain social contexts, hermeneutical injustice can mean that someone is 
socially constituted as, and perhaps even caused to be, something they are not, and which 
it is against their interests to be seen to be. Th us we can say, without essentializing, that 
they are prevented from becoming who they really are. Hermeneutical injustice is an 
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epistemic injustice with social constructive power. It is an epistemic inequality that can 
bring real injury to the insult of hermeneutical marginalization. If all epistemic injustice 
undermines the subject specifi cally in his capacity as a knower, then we can identify the 
distinctive manner in which hermeneutical injustice does this by saying that it undermines 
the subject in his capacity as an interpreter of his own social experience, in his capacity, 
that is, for social self-knowledge.
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notes
1 Th is paper is drawn from the fi nal chapter of a forthcoming book in which I explore two 
distinctive kinds of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice, in which prejudice causes a hearer 
to give a speaker less credibility than she otherwise would; and hermeneutical injustice—the 
subject of this paper. Th e book is forthcoming as Epistemic Injustice: Power and Th e Ethics of 
Knowing; I thank Oxford University Press for permission to publish this material here.
2 On a view such as Keith Lehrer’s (1997), which accounts for knowledge in coherentist terms 
that make it depend upon self-trust on the part of the subject, the connection between erosion 
of epistemic confi dence and the capacity to possess knowledge is starkly direct. (I take it that 
loss of epistemic confi dence is equivalent to, or at least entails, loss of epistemic self-trust.) 
3 For related discussions of social construction, see Rae Langton (1998); and Sally Haslanger 
(1995).
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